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Fiduciary Breach, Once Removed
Deborah A. DeMott*
Introduction
In Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions,1 Professor Andrew
Tuch argues that investment bankers serving as advisors on merger and
acquisition (“M&A”) transactions should be characterized as fiduciaries who
advise and act on behalf of their clients. Additionally, Professor Tuch
examines the present state of Delaware law through the lens of optimal
deterrence theory, finds that it under deters disloyalty, and proposes
additional measures better to assure that investment bankers are subject to
sanctions more closely approximating the social costs that stem from
disloyalty in the M&A context. The article is provocative, informative, and
so richly developed that this Response cannot pretend to be comprehensive.
Instead, this Response focuses on the principal legal vehicle through which
recent Delaware cases impose monetary liability on investment bankers. This
is the tort of aiding and abetting—or lending substantial assistance to—
another actor’s breach of fiduciary duty—in this setting, breaches by the
board of directors that an investment bank advised and represented.
The Response delineates this under scrutinized tort, freshly prominent
(and controversial) in the wake of the $76 million judgment against an
investment bank upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in RBC Capital
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Markets, LLC v. Jervis.2 To be sure, the tort’s stance is indirect or secondary,3
but that does not undermine its significance as a potential source of liability.
The tort’s potency also confirms the heterogeneity of interests protected by
contemporary tort law,4 which, capable as it is interstitial operation, can fill
in gaps left by other sources of law and regulation. Complicating the picture
is the fact that through contract an investment bank and its client demarcate
their relationship’s scope and, at least potentially, limit the bank’s liability.
To impose aiding-and-abetting liability on investment bankers may appear
potentially unbalanced or one sided. As is well known, Delaware law enables
exculpation from monetary liability of directors whose breaches of fiduciary
duty amount to no more than gross negligence untainted by disloyalty.5
Delaware has long protected directors who reasonably rely on advisers,
including investment banks providing fairness opinions in M&A
transactions.6 Seen in this broader perspective, aiding-and-abetting liability
is a vehicle that disrupts an overall pattern that attenuates liability risks and
shifts ultimate responsibility to actors situated outside the corporation, who
seem more remote from liability.7 Although the disruption does not operate
as fully or neatly as Professor Tuch’s analysis would require for optimaldeterrence purposes, its potential is substantial.
This Response proceeds by situating aiding-and-abetting liability within
the broader framework of contemporary tort law. As structured, this tort
illustrates the centrality of duty within tort doctrine. The Response then turns
to selected specifics of RBC Capital and the Delaware cases that preceded
and followed it. As it happens, both the holding in RBC Capital and
contemporary tort doctrine make salient another intentional tort—fraud—
that’s distinct from aiding-and-abetting liability. The RBC court emphasizes
how the principal investment bank “knowingly induced the breach” by its
client’s directors and “illicit[ly] manipulate[ed] . . . the [b]oard’s deliberative
processes” by warping the financial analysis furnished to the board.8 These
characterizations venture into the province of fraud and beyond other modes

2. 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
3. See Tuch, supra note 1, at 1147–48.
4. Stated more vividly, tort law exemplifies what to some observers is the common law’s
character as “‘a chaos with a full index.’” Gerald J. Postema, Introduction: Search for an
Explanatory Theory of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 1, 1 (Gerald J. Postema ed.,
2001) (referring to Sir Thomas Holland’s characterization (internal citation omitted)).
5. As one of the amici in RBC Capital characterized the result, imposing aiding-and-abetting
liability “would create an anomalous imbalance of responsibilities where a non-fiduciary may be
held liable for an unintentional violation of a fiduciary duty by a fiduciary.” 129 A.3d at 865.
Delaware permits exculpatory provisions in certificates of incorporation consistent with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2014).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (West 2014).
7. Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2006).
8. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 862–63. To be sure, the bank also failed to disclose its conflicting
interests to the board, an omission discussed below.
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of culpable participation in a board’s breach of duty.9 This Response next
examines the always contested relationship between fiduciary duty and
contract, relevant here because a client engaging an investment bank enters
into a contract with the bank for services as specified by their agreement. As
Professor Tuch observes, RBC Capital “muddied the waters somewhat”
because the court equivocated on the role of contract in specifying and
modifying duties owed by actors who contract to provide advisory or
representational services.10 This Response suggests a clarification that
emphasizes the distinctive qualities of aiding and abetting as an intentional
tort.
I.

The Structure of Aiding-and-Abetting Liability

The elements of aiding-and-abetting liability are settled in Delaware
cases and general tort doctrine. To establish that an actor aided and abetted a
fiduciary’s breach of duty requires showing the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, a breach of duty by the fiduciary, knowing participation by the
actor in the breach, and damages proximately caused by the breach.11 The
same basic structure governs claims that an actor aided and abetted any other
instance of tortious conduct, such as fraud.12 Importantly, aiding and abetting
a fiduciary’s breach of duty is an intentional tort because the actor must have
acted with scienter, that is, must have acted “‘knowingly, intentionally, or

9. Thus, my reading of RBC Capital adds to—without necessarily disagreeing with—Professor
Tuch’s conclusion that the Delaware cases “envision[] M&A advisors as loyal advisors of their
clients.” See Tuch, supra note 1, at 1154.
10. Tuch, supra note 1, at 1142.
11. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876(b) (1979). Contemporary English law, likewise, recognizes a theory of liability against
actors who knowingly assist or induce breaches of trust or fiduciary duty. See PAUL S. DAVIES,
ACCESSORY LIABILITY 96–100 (2015). English law categorizes the underlying or primary wrong
as a breach of an equitable obligation, not a tort. When the primary wrong is a tort, accessory liability
under English law requires showing that the defendant authorized the primary wrongdoing,
combined with the primary wrongdoer, or induced the wrong. Id. at 213–21. Knowingly to lend
assistance to the primary wrongdoer by itself does not suffice for liability, in contrast with blackletter U.S. law. In RBC Capital, RBC urged the court to adopt what amounts to the English position:
that “aiding and abetting is a ‘subset of conspiracy’ and therefore rests on proof that the aider and
abettor agreed to a joint course of conduct with the primary actor.” RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 861.
In response, the court relied on Malpiede’s standard configuration of the tort’s elements. For further
discussion comparing U.S. and English law on aiding-and-abetting liability, see generally Deborah
A. DeMott, Accessory Disloyalty: Comparative Perspectives on Substantial Assistance to Fiduciary
Breach, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE (Paul S. Davies & James E. Penner eds., forthcoming
2017).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). The illustrations to this section engage
a wide array of tortious conduct, spanning the strict-liability tort of trespass, negligence, and the
intentional physical torts of battery and false imprisonment. On the distinctive form of wrongfulness
captured by aiding-and-abetting torts, see Deborah A. DeMott, Culpable Participation in Fiduciary
Breach, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold, eds.,
forthcoming 2016).
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with reckless indifference . . . .’”13 But the primary wrongdoer—the
fiduciary—need not have acted with a level of culpability that matches the
scienter required for aiding-and-abetting liability.14 Whether the knowledge
element requires showing that action was taken with actual knowledge or
whether constructive knowledge will suffice is open to dispute,15 as is
whether “conscious avoidance,” sometimes termed willful blindness, can
substitute for actual knowledge on the part of the secondary actor whose
furnished substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer.16
Integral to the tort’s definition is the element of participatory action that
assists the primary breach. Knowledgeable omissions or failures to act do not
count as substantial assistance because aiding-and-abetting liability requires
that a defendant have affirmatively assisted or concealed the primary
wrongdoer’s misconduct. Put differently, absent a duty of disclosure,
possessing knowledge of the primary wrongdoer’s conduct does not trigger
aiding-and-abetting liability for actors who remain silent, even when doing
so furthers their own interests.
Starkly illustrating this point, in In re Sharp International Corp.,17 a
bank officer with lending responsibility for a corporate borrower came to
suspect (and with good reason) that the borrower’s controlling shareholders
were looting its assets and otherwise engaging in fraud.18 After confirming
the officer’s suspicions through third-party sources of information, the bank
then allegedly “arranged quietly” for the borrower to repay its loan from the
proceeds of new indebtedness created by selling new notes to unsuspecting
purchasers, who had already invested in notes.19 Giving the purchasers no
warnings and blowing no whistles on the borrower, the bank also forbore to
pull the borrower’s line of credit when the bank had the right to foreclose and
consented to the borrower’s incurrence of new indebtedness, as their loan
agreement required. Once the noteholders invested the new $25 million, the
borrower paid off the bank’s loan; soon thereafter the fraud came to light and

13. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 862 (quoting Metro Commc’n Corp. v. Advanced Mobilecomm
Techs, Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 143 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979). Likewise, contemporary English
law does not require symmetrical culpability as between primary and secondary defendants. See
DAVIES, supra note 11, at 13–14 (underscoring that accessories must be culpable, but their
culpability need not have to be identical to the primary wrongdoer’s).
15. Compare RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 862 (aider and abettor had actual or constructive
knowledge that conduct was legally improper), with Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset
Mgmt., LLC, 479 F. Supp. 2d 349, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (constructive knowledge is insufficient).
16. Compare Fraternity Fund, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 368 (showing that the defendant acted
consciously to avoid learning the truth involves a culpable state of mind and may satisfy knowledge
element), with Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank, 947 N.E.2d 581, 598 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)
(conscious avoidance does not establish knowledge in the aiding-and-abetting context).
17. 403 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2005).
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id.
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the borrower entered bankruptcy.20 Although the bank’s forbearance assisted
the fraud by delaying its revelation, the court held that the bank’s conduct did
not constitute culpable participation in the fraud. By consenting to the
borrower’s incurrence of new indebtedness, the bank only removed an
impediment; it neither induced nor concealed its borrower’s fraud. Under the
circumstances the bank had no “duty to consider the interests of anyone else”
and it did not communicate with the prospective note purchasers.21 Acting to
protect its own interests did not constitute “participation” in the fraud.22
As Sharp illustrates, aiding-and-abetting liability is consistent with the
inescapable presence of duty as a fundamental organizing principle in
contemporary tort law. All actors are subject to a negative duty to refrain
from conduct that constitutes an intentional tort such as fraud, battery, or
conversion; an actor whose conduct creates a risk of physical harm ordinarily
has a duty to exercise reasonable care.23 For actors in neither category, duty
requires a distinct justification, grounded for example in a special
relationship between the actor and persons within the confines of the
relationship.24 Like the bank in Sharp, actors generally are, in the absence of
a special relationship, under no duty to rescue prospective victims from a
peril that the actor did not create. Always a reliable way to illustrate
disconnects between moral intuition and the common law, the proposition
that there is no general duty to rescue can be critiqued and rationalized on
many bases. Not the least among rationalizing strategies is the difficulty of
proving that an actor’s failure to act was the cause-in-fact of harm to someone
else.25 Moreover, focusing on the centrality of duty helps to situate RBC
Capital and other cases examined by Professor Tuch well within
contemporary tort law, as the next section explains.
II.

Investment Bankers as Tortfeasors

As Professor Tuch explores in detail, several recent cases in Delaware
courts scrutinized the conduct of investment bankers in M&A transactions in
suits brought by shareholders alleging that the bankers, subject to undisclosed
conflicts of interest, aided and abetted breaches of duty by directors of the
target corporation.26 In these cases, the failure of the target’s directors to act

20. The borrower’s controlling shareholders also pled guilty to criminal charges. Id. at 48.
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7(a) (2010).
24. Id. § 40 cmt. f (2012).
25. Id. § 37 cmt. e (2012).
26. For cases preceding RBC Capital, see In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434
(Del. Ch. 2012) (involving directors who relied on advice from an M&A advisor that owned 19%
equity interest in the prospective buyer led by a team headed by a banker with a large personal
shareholding in the buyer), In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817, 833–34
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reasonably to obtain the best deal for shareholders constituted the primary
breach. Knowing of this failure, the M&A advisors allegedly facilitated the
directors’ primary breach by providing flawed advice concerning valuation,
undermining the board’s processes, or otherwise.27 Unsurprisingly, these
cases proved controversial.28 The Court of Chancery resolved all cases but
one without full trial on the merits.29 Thus the significance in late 2015 of
RBC Capital, in which the Delaware Supreme Court endorsed the
applicability of aiding-and-abetting liability following trial in the Court of
Chancery and post-trial opinions from the lower court. RBC Capital thus
“went the distance” through pre-trial discovery and trial on the merits,
enabling both courts to apply the law in light of facts fully tested and
developed at trial.30 Nonetheless, this procedural history does not explain a
striking quality of the Supreme Court’s opinion. Although the appellant bank
emphasized to the court that it made no arguments on appeal requiring review
of findings of fact, the court examined the record in its entirety. A detailed
factual narrative as supported by the record occupies more pages in the
opinion than the court’s analysis of those facts applying the law.31 But the
Supreme Court’s factual narrative underlies its parsing of elements requisite
for aiding-and-abetting liability in terms that appear congenial to a
complementary account of liability—fraud—to sustain the judgment against
the appellant.
The appellant (RBC) in RBC Capital, engaged to advise the board of
Rural/Metro Corp. (“Rural”) about its potential sale, structured the sale
process on two tracks to enable RBC to secure a role in financing the sale and
acquisition of another company, which was a competitor of Rural. This, of
course, resulted in a complicated sale process, daunted as it was by timing
and confidentiality concerns. RBC did not disclose its interest in obtaining
an additional and more lucrative engagement to provide financing for the
purchase of the competitor, nor did it initially disclose its plan to use the Rural
sell-side advisory engagement as a hook to capture buy-side financing work
from bidders for Rural’s competitor.32 As Professor Tuch characterizes the
(Del. Ch. 2011) (regarding a target M&A advisor, inter alia, that surreptitiously assisted potential
bidders in formulating a joint bid), and In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005–
06 (Del. Ch. 2005) (calling into question the propriety of staple financing, i.e., acquisition financing
offered by target’s M&A advisor to prospective bidders).
27. Tuch, supra note 1, at 1103–04.
28. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEXAS L.
REV. 1, 3–7 (2014) (noting controversy).
29. See id. at 6 (referencing In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014)).
30. RBC Capital is not a case in which the facts exonerated the defendants upon full testing and
development. See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 10774–VCL, 2016 WL 402540, at *17
(Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2016) (discussing In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), as instance in which defendants prevailed on the merits after
a full trial in a case that “went the distance”).
31. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 823–48.
32. Id. at 862.
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consequence, RBC “compromised the sale process,” tilting it toward the
bidder most likely to provide it with financing fees.33 As the sale process
proceeded, RBC lobbied for a financing role, while at the same time leading
negotiations over the sale price for Rural. And RBC engaged in “illicit
manipulation” of Rural’s board’s deliberative processes through a warped
financial analysis, leaving the board unaware that RBC altered its valuation
analyses.34 All led to a “poorly-timed sale at a price that was not the product
of appropriate efforts to obtain the best value reasonably available,”
aggravated by the board’s “failure to recognize that Rural’s stand-alone value
exceeded the sale price.”35 RBC’s conduct, including its failure to make full
disclosure of its conflicts, led to another breach of duty by the board via a
proxy statement that included a false valuation analysis and omitted
information about RBC’s conflicts.36 Although Rural’s board engaged a
second investment bank for negotiations with the company’s eventual
purchaser, that bank’s financial analysis was secondary to RBC’s and its
compensation (like RBC’s) was contingent on concluding a transaction. Thus
the secondary bank’s involvement did not break the causal chain proximately
linking RBC to the harm suffered by shareholders.37
In summary, for the Supreme Court, RBC “misled” Rural’s board into
a breach of the duty of care, thereby acting with scienter to aid and abet the
board’s breach of fiduciary duty.38 Knowingly to mislead another through a
material misrepresentation to induce that person to act or refrain from acting
is a predicate of common law fraud.39 Additionally, failing to disclose
material information constitutes common law fraud when an actor has made
a prior statement that the actor knows will mislead another if it is not
amended, or when the parties’ relationship obliges the actor to make
disclosure.40 In an ongoing advisory relationship, failures to disclose can

33. Tuch, supra note 1, at 1139.
34. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 863.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 857–60, 863.
37. Id. at 863–65.
38. Id. at 863. See also In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 99 (Del. Ch. 2014) (for purposes
of aiding-and-abetting liability, a court need only find that a defendant misled directors into
breaching their duty of care for improper motives of its own).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2014) (stating the general rule of liability for the tort of fraud). As formulated in general tort
doctrine, fraud requires showing that the recipient of a misrepresentation relied on it in acting or
refraining from acting and that the reliance was justifiable. Id. § 11. And only the recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation may recover against the maker of the statement. Id. The required match
between recipient, reliance, and loss suffered through reliance is not a perfect fit with the
configuration in RBC Capital, in which the target’s directors were the recipients of the
misrepresentations but the loss was suffered by the shareholders whose company was sold. For this
reason (and no doubt others) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a more plausible
theory of liability.
40. Id. § 13(a)–(b).
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breach duties that do not govern relationships among parties who are not so
linked, like the lender in Sharp and subsequent purchasers of its crooked
borrower’s notes.41 To be sure, when an advisor intentionally misleads a
board of directors with the consequence that the board breaches its own duties
to shareholders, the advisor’s conduct readily fits within the contours of
aiding-and-abetting liability. As the elements of the tort are formulated,
RBC’s conduct appears to lie at one (admittedly extreme) end of a spectrum
of possible means through which an investment bank might knowingly
participate in a board’s breach of duty.
The Supreme Court’s opinion stresses the narrowness of the Chancery
Court’s holding—which it affirmed—that misleading a board or creating an
informational vacuum triggered aiding-and-abetting liability.42 All the same,
the Supreme Court’s legal analysis begins with the broader statement of the
elements of aiding-and-abetting liability with which Section II of this
Response begins,43 leaving open the prospect of liability on less extreme
facts, especially so when problematic facts concerning the target’s directors
or the process leading to the transaction are not fully disclosed to
shareholders.44
RBC Capital, like aiding-and-abetting cases more generally, illustrates
the foundational significance of duty within contemporary tort law that this
Response stressed in Section II. As the Supreme Court formulated the duty,
41. In re Sharp Int’l Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 47–52 (2d Cir. 2005)
42. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 862.
43. Id. at 861. This broader statement encompasses the holdings of cases decided by the Court
of Chancery prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in RBC Capital. See, e.g., In re TIBCO Software
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 WL 6155894, at *24–26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015)
(denying a motion to dismiss when an investment bank, arguably concerned lest it jeopardize $47.7
million fee, allegedly created an “informational vacuum” by withholding information from the
board concerning miscount of target shares relevant to how the buyer calculated deal consideration,
including information that the buyer conceded to the bank that it relied on miscount); In re Zale
Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015)
(denying a motion to dismiss when an investment bank allegedly undermined the target board’s
ability to maximize stockholder value in a merger when the senior member of the bank’s team had
earlier “pitched” the target to an eventual bidder while in possession of inside information
concerning the target and the target board relied on the bank’s representation that it had had only
limited prior relationships with the bidder). See also Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 152
(mem.) (Del. 2016) (affirming Zale as modified following reargument, see 2015 WL 6551418 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 29, 2015), and “distanc[ing]” Supreme Court from Court of Chancery’s treatment of
financial advisor’s liability). Singh expresses skepticism that the requisite scienter could be inferred
from the adviser’s alleged wrongdoing. See 137 A.3d at 152. Singh also emphasizes that “[n]othing
in this record comes close to approaching the sort of behavior at issue” in RBC Capital. Id. at 153.
44. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015) (holding that the
business judgment rule is applicable to a merger transaction through which a limited partnership
acquired interests in a limited liability company, where full disclosure was made of “all of the
objective facts” concerning target board’s interests, process leading to transaction, and interests of
acquiring party, followed by approval of the merger by an uncoerced shareholder vote); In re
Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 10485-VCMR, 2016 WL 3626521, at * 18 (Del. Ch. June 30,
2016) (holding that a fully informed and uncoerced shareholder vote approving merger forecloses
aiding-and-abetting claims against secondary actors).
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it’s to refrain from action that constitutes an intentional tort.45 In contrast, the
Court of Chancery ventured further, and into legally uncharted waters, in
formulating an advisor’s duty. In dictum, the Court of Chancery cast M&A
advisors in the role of “gatekeepers,” that is, parties external to the
corporation who provide verification services to those who lack the requisite
expertise, such as a target corporation’s directors.46 But the observation that
M&A advisors “function as gatekeepers”47 lacks a translation into tort law’s
vocabulary of duty: what conduct does the duty require or proscribe? And to
whom is it owed? And who has a claim against the advisor when the duty is
breached? The Supreme Court, explicitly rejecting the “gatekeeper” dictum,
stressed the contractual underpinnings of investment-banker retention,48
explored in Section III of this Response. In any event, an investment bank’s
duty to refrain from intentionally tortious conduct does not itself create a duty
to prevent directors from breaching their own duties to shareholders. A bank
might undertake such a duty, as any actor may undertake a duty to protect
another from harm,49 or regulation might impose gatekeeping duties, but the
duty does not stem from the more basic obligation that proscribes the
commission of intentional torts.
Consequences follow from the fact that aiding and abetting is an
intentional tort.50 In some jurisdictions, an intentional tortfeasor is barred
from obtaining contribution from other tortfeasors when the intentional
tortfeasor has paid—or would pay—more than its share of any judgment
amount, based on its share of responsibility.51 But Delaware imposes no such
categorical bar. In an opinion addressing questions of first impression
stemming from RBC’s quest for contribution, the Court of Chancery held that
no bright-line rule bars contribution for intentional tortfeasors.52 RBC sought
to claim credit against the judgment amount for amounts paid in settlement
by other defendants.53 Nothing in Delaware’s statute authorizing contribution
imposes such a bar, while a prior case applying Delaware law to bar
contribution involved a tortfeasor who consciously intended to cause
physical harm.54 Nonetheless, the court applied the equitable doctrine of
45. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 862–63.
46. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 88 (Del. Ch. 2014).
47. Id.
48. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 865 n.191.
49. In the realm of physical harm, undertaking a duty to guard or otherwise reduce the risk of
harm to another person is well-established. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 (2012).
50. Implications for insurability and insurance coverage come to mind.
51. See In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 233–35 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(discussing fragmentation among states on the question of contribution for intentional torts).
52. Id. at 227.
53. Id. at 236. Alone among the defendants—Rural’s directors and both investment banks—
RBC did not settle before trial.
54. Id. at 233.
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unclean hands to bar RBC from claiming settlement credit to the extent RBC
perpetrated a fraud on Rural’s board.55 This had the consequence of barring
the credit for all but the portions of the claim concerning the sale process that
did not involve RBC’s misrepresentations and omissions targeted toward
Rural’s board and the secondary investment bank.56 The Supreme Court
affirmed, agreeing that to hold otherwise would permit RBC to take
“advantage of the targets of its own misconduct.”57
Surveying the broader landscape of tort law suggests that actors who
commit torts requiring culpability fit in three general categories of conduct:
“‘inadvertence,’”58 which typifies negligence; inadequate impulse control,
which typifies most intentional physical torts; and deliberation or calculation,
which typifies both fraud and, as this Response argues, knowingly assisting
or encouraging a fiduciary’s breach of duty. Although it’s understandable to
focus on M&A advisors’ conflicting interests generated by prior or ongoing
ties with other parties, the broader perspective that tort law affords makes
more prominent the range of motivations that may undermine an advisor’s
performance. In particular, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in RBC
Capital, although outcome-contingent compensation structures can be
“salutary” because they align the advisor’s pecuniary interests with its
client’s,59 the advisor’s interest in securing its fee can lead it to withhold
information from the target’s board60 or defer disclosure of a conflict or
another inconvenient truth until the board has no practical alternative to
completing the transaction.61

55. Id. at 239.
56. Id. In the end, the court allocated 17% of the responsibility for damages suffered by Rural’s
shareholders to two directors with personal interests inclining them toward a sale. Id. at 262. This
had a dollar value of $15,525,004.28, which was greater than the settlement payments made by
those directors ($6.6 million) and the secondary investment bank ($5 million). Id. RBC’s liability
was reduced by the larger of these two amounts, which implies that the two directors were wise to
settle. Id.
57. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 876.
58. See Rural/Metro, 102 A.3d at 228 (quoting Professor Charles O. Gregory, drafter of the
1939 uniform act on which Delaware’s statutory treatment of contribution among tortfeasors is
based).
59. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 864.
60. In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 1, 2015) (involving disclosure of an advisor’s pitch concerning a client to the acquirer that was
not made until prompted by preparation of proxy materials after the merger agreement was signed).
But see Attenborough v. Singh, 137 A.3d 151, 153 (mem.) (Del. 2016) (observing that nothing in
record “comes close to approaching” conduct in RBC Capital and questioning whether facts support
inference of the requisite scienter).
61. In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 WL 6155894, at *25–
26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015) (regarding an advisor, anticipating $47.4 million fee, that concealed
from the target board information that shares had been miscounted and that the acquirer relied on
the miscount in calculating the consideration it would pay).
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III. Contract and Duties
In disavowing the characterization of M&A advisors as “gatekeepers,”
the Supreme Court’s opinion in RBC Capital observes that the Chancery
Court did “not adequately take into account the fact that the role of a financial
advisor is primarily contractual in nature, is typically negotiated between
sophisticated parties, and can vary based upon a myriad of factors.”62
Professor Tuch fairly characterizes this passage as having “muddied the
waters.”63 A few lines later on, the same passage continues: “[t]he banker is
under an obligation not to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of
the board of directors, thereby undermining the very advice that it knows the
directors will be relying upon in their decision making processes.”64 Based
on the analysis thus far in this Response, one might reconcile these passages
by treating the duty not to undermine its own advice as acknowledging that
knowingly to dupe one’s client to its detriment constitutes an intentional tort
that carries legal consequences, which are likely to follow regardless of how
the parties’ contractual arrangements defined the advisor’s responsibilities.
This is so even when an advisor agrees to provide only limited services as
specified in its engagement.65
An additional dimension of structuring a contract with an advisor
warrants separate discussion. The process that leads to a contract can be
integral to how a target board discharges its own duties in choosing an advisor
and assuring that the advisor is capable of loyal service, taking into account
asymmetries of information and insight between the advisor and its client. A
good starting point is a set of representations and warranties concerning
conflicts incorporated into an engagement letter, which suggests the
significant role early on that legal counsel should play.66 As RBC Capital
underlines, directors “need to be active and reasonably informed when
overseeing the sale process, including identifying and responding to actual or
potential conflicts of interest.”67 Although the board may consent to a
conflict, its duty includes requiring that the advisor disclose, on an ongoing

62. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 865 n.191.
63. Tuch, supra note 1, at 1142.
64. 129 A.3d at 865 n.191.
65. See Houseman v. Sagerman, No. 8897-VCG, 2014 WL 1600724, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16,
2014) (holding that the board of the target company retained the bank for limited services as
specified by agreement, having determined that cost considerations ruled out incurring expense of
obtaining a fairness opinion; the board, which undertook some process to achieve the best price for
the shareholders, did not act in bad faith; and the fact that the bank agreed to provide, and did
provide, only limited services does not support the inference that the bank knew of the breach of
fiduciary duty by the board).
66. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can
Improve Boardroom Decision-making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone, 70 BUS. LAW. 679,
689–90 (2015).
67. RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 855.
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basis, material information relevant to the board’s sale process.68 And the
board might deal with an advisor known to be conflicted “at arm’s-length”
by insisting on contractually-defined “protections to ensure that conflicts that
might impact the board’s process are disclosed.”69 Alternatively, the board
would be wise to choose an advisor that is free—or that represents it is free—
of material conflicts, as well as to negotiate contract terms that enable the
board to mitigate the costs of engaging a second advisor when the board
learns its initial advisor no longer can be trusted.70
Finally, these specifics should not cloud the basic point that contract’s
potential to address an advisor’s conflicts of interest does not insulate the
advisor from liability on the basis of generalized acknowledgements that the
advisor might do business with other parties, including parties involved in
transactions with the target.71 Although the Supreme Court’s opinion
encourages ex ante contractual arrangements concerning conflicts, it does not
override the basic point that consent requires knowledge and specificity.
Again, tort law is a source of illumination: consent, which may be manifested
by action or inaction or in words, is “willingness in fact for conduct to
occur.”72 Additionally, returning to the court’s formulation in RBC Capital,
undertaking to furnish advice and act in a representative capacity can limit
the operative effect of consent that an adviser obtains from a client when
what’s consented to would undermine the advisory relationship.73
Conclusion
The relationships explored by Professor Tuch are complex, as is the
professional work done by M&A advisors. This complexity, like that of the
cases that followed, can divert attention from the ease with which advisors’
conduct detailed in the cases fits within established categories of intentional
tort. Seeing these cases from this perspective clarifies the legal interests at
stake.

68. Id. at 856.
69. Id. at 856 n.130.
70. For this possibility, see Eric S. Klinger-Wilensky & Nathan P. Emeritz, Financial Advisor
Engagement Letters: Post-Rural/Metro Thoughts and Observations, 71 BUS. LAW. 53, 57, 71–72
(2016).
71. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 100–01 (Del. Ch. 2014).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1979). Elsewhere I argue that the same
definition of consent is applicable within agency law to a principal’s consent to conduct by the agent
that would other constitute a breach of the agent’s duty of loyalty. See Deborah A. DeMott, Defining
Agency and Its Scope (II), in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES 396, 407–08 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg eds., 2016).
73. This is consistent with the standard applicable to agents; in obtaining such consent from a
principal the agent must act in good faith and deal fairly with the principal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 8.06(1)(a) (2006).

